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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

JANICE ROUNDS and DYLAN ROUNDS,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
-v-

Case No. 930460-CA

THE STATE OF UTAH , and UTAH
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION,
Defendants-Appellees.

Catecrorv 15

BRIEF OF DEFENDANTS - APPELLEES
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The instant action comes within the original jurisdiction of
the Supreme Court of Utah under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3) (j)
(Supp. 1993).

Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(4) (Supp.

1993), and Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(k) (Supp. 1993), this
Court has jurisdiction over this appeal by reason of the transfer
of this action from the Supreme Court of Utah to the Utah Court
of Appeals.
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
1.

The judgment of the trial court was not invalidated by

the alleged failure of the defendants to file a notice of signing
or entry of judgment.
STANDARD OF REVIEW:

The district court judge is vested with

considerable discretion under Rule 60(b) of the Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure ,in deciding whether to grant or deny a motion to
set aside a judgment.

Katz v. Pierce, 732 P.2d 92, 93 (Utah

1986) . A denial of such a motion should be reversed only for an

abuse of discretion.

State, Dep't of Social Serv. v. Viiil, 784

P.2d 1130, 1132 (Utah 1989).
2.

Plaintiffs have not been prejudiced by the alleged

failure of the defendants to file a notice of signing or entry of
judgment.
STANDARD OF REVIEW:

This standard of review is the same as

for the first issue, supra.
3.

Plaintiffs' motion to set aside the judgment, coming

under Rule 60(b)(1) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, was
untimely.
STANDARD OF REVIEW:

The trial court's determination as to

which clause of Rule 60(b) is applicable, is either reviewed
under abuse of discretion (Gardiner and Gardiner Builders v.
Swapp, 656 P.2d 429, 430 (Utah 1982)) or is reviewed for
correctness (Lincoln Beneficial Life v. D.T. S. Properties, 83 8
P.2d 672, 674 (Utah App. 1992)).
4.

Even if plaintiffs' motion to set aside the judgment,

was considered as coming under Rule 60(b)(7) of the Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure, it was untimely.
STANDARD OF REVIEW:

This standard of review is the same as

for the first issue, supra.
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES AND RULES
Rule 58A(d), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure
(1993)
Notice of signing or entry of judgment. The
prevailing party shall promptly give notice
of the signing or entry of judgment to all
other parties and shall file proof of service
of such notice with the clerk of the court.
2

However, the time for filing a notice of
appeal is not affected by the notice
requirement of this provision.
Rule 60, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure (1993)
(This Rule is set forth verbatim in the
addendum to this brief)
Rule 4-504, Utah Code of Judicial
Administration (1993)
(This Rule is set forth verbatim in the
addendum to this brief)
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Plaintiffs brought the instant action against the State of
Utah and its Department of Transportation.

R. 2-5.

Defendants

filed two motions to compel discovery (R. 21-35, 77-101) and a
motion to dismiss (R. 102-7).

Plaintiffs, rather than respond to

the motion to dismiss and the second motion to compel discovery,
proposed to defendants that the parties stipulate to the
dismissal of this action without prejudice.

R. 140. Defendants

trial counsel prepared a stipulation and order of dismissal and
sent the same to plaintiffs' counsel.

R. 140, 144-45.

Plaintiffs' counsel declined to sign the stipulation as prepared,
and instead prepared a new stipulation and order of dismissal
that he signed and sent to defendants counsel.1 R. 140, 148-49.
Plaintiffs' proposed stipulation and order were acceptable to the
defendants counsel, who signed the same and submitted it to the
court pursuant to the plaintiffs' attorneys instructions.

1

R.

While prepared by the plaintiffs' attorney, this second
proposed stipulation and order has the defendants' counsels name
in its heading.
3

167.

Defendants counsel asked his secretary to send a copy of

the stipulation and order to plaintiffs' attorney, and the
original to the court.

R. 167.

The trial court signed the order of dismissal on September
16, 1991. R. 118-19. No notice of signing or entry of judgment
appears in the record.

On January 15, 1993, some sixteen months

after the entry of the order of dismissal in this action,
plaintiffs filed their motion for relief from judgment.
37.

R. 120-

The trial court denied this motion on March 9, 1993. R.

183-84.
1993.

The plaintiffs filed their notice of appeal on April 5,

R. 185-87.
STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS

On June 20 and 21, 1991 respectively, defendants counsel
filed two motions: a motion to compel plaintiffs to provide
sufficient answers to interrogatories that had been served on
August 20, 1990; and a motion to dismiss without prejudice
because plaintiffs failed to file the undertaking required by
Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-19 (1989).

R. 77-107.

Plaintiffs did not

respond to these motions, so on July 15, 1991 the motions were
submitted for decision.

R. 108-9.

On July 23, 1991, counsel for the parties stipulated, and
the court so ordered, that plaintiffs be allowed until August 15,
1991 to respond to these motions.

R. 110-13.

Sometime after

August 15, 1991, but before September 3, 1991, plaintiffs'
counsel called defendants' attorney, informing him that
plaintiffs would stipulate to dismiss this action without
4

prejudice if defendants would withdraw their motion to compel.
R. 140, 167. Defendants' counsel agreed, prepared a stipulation
and order and had it delivered to plaintiffs' counsel on
September 3, 1991 for approval.

R. 140, 144-47, 167.

On September 4, 1991, plaintiffs' counsel mailed to the
defendants' attorney a court document entitled "Stipulation and
Order of Dismissal Without Prejudice."

The State of Utah's

counsel reviewed it and signed it on September 6, 1991. R. 14 0,
148-49, 167. This agreed to stipulation and order was signed by
the trial court on September 16, 1991. R. 118-19.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Plaintiffs' attorney proposed to defendants' counsel that
this action be dismissed without prejudice.

Plaintiff's counsel

drafted the proposed stipulation, signed it, and sent it to the
defendants' counsel for signature and to be presented to the
court.

This was done, and the trial court dismissed the action

without prejudice pursuant to the stipulation of the parties.
Sixteen months later plaintiffs' attorneys sought to have the
judgment set aside on the sole basis that the defendants'
attorney did not send the plaintiffs' counsel a notice of the
entry or signing of the order prepared by plaintiffs' attorney.
While required by both the Rules of Civil Procedure and the
Utah Code of Judicial Administration, the failure of a party to
file a notice of signing or entry of judgment does not invalidate
the judgment of the trial court. Without more, plaintiffs cannot

5

prove they were prejudiced by the trial court's signing and
filing of the order prepared by the plaintiffs' attorney.
Plaintiffs claims fall under Rule 60(b)(1) of the Utah Rules
of Civil Procedure.

Therefore, plaintiffs' motion was untimely

because it was filed well after the three month time limitation
established by the rule.

Even if the plaintiffs motion fell

within subsection seven of the rule, the failure to learn that
the order that they had prepared and approved had been signed for
fourteen months was not reasonable.
ARGUMENT
I. THE CORRECT STANDARD OF REVIEW IN THE
INSTANT ACTION IS WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT
ABUSED ITS DISCRETION
Plaintiffs have set out, as the standard of review in this
action, a correction of error standard.
1.

This is incorrect.

of the instant action.2

Brief of Appellants at

This is not an appeal from the dismissal
Instead, this action concerns the trial

court's denial of a motion to set aside judgment that was filed
some sixteen months after the entry of that judgment.

The

relevant standard of review is one of abuse of discretion.
The district court judge is vested with
considerable discretion under Rule 60(b) in
granting or denying a motion to set aside a
judgment. . . . But, before we will
interfere with the trial court's exercise of
discretion, abuse of that discretion must be
clearly shown. That some basis may exist to
set aside the default does not require the
conclusion that the court abused its

2

No such appeal was taken for the obvious fact that the
parties stipulated to dismissing this action.
6

discretion in refusing to do so when facts
and circumstances support the refusal.
Katz v. Pierce, 732 P.2d 92, 93 (Utah 1986) (citation omitted).
Review in this action is not to "correct error."

Rather, it is

this Court's duty to determine whether plaintiffs have clearly
shown that the trial court abused its discretion.

If plaintiffs

cannot meet this higher standard, then the order of the trial
court should be affirmed.

One of the exceptions to this

deferential abuse of discretion standard is where the grounds for
the motion to set aside the judgment are claims that the trial
court lacked jurisdiction to enter the challenged order in the
first place.

Van Per Stappen v. Van Per Stappen, 815 P.2d 1335,

1337 (Utah App. 1991) ; State, Pep't of Social Serv. v. Viiil, 784
P.2d 1130, 1132 (Utah 1989).
Plaintiffs have not alleged that the trial court was without
jurisdiction in this action.

No jurisdictional claim has ever

been raised by the plaintiffs.

Rather, the plaintiffs' only

claim is that the otherwise valid judgment should have been set
aside because plaintiffs did not receive notice of its entry.
The limited exception concerning jurisdictional questions is
inapplicable to the instant action.
The other possible exception to this rule is where the trial
court makes a determination as to which clause of Rule 60(b) is
applicable.

This court has stated that it accords no particular

deference to such a conclusion of law, but reviews it for
correctness.

Lincoln Beneficial Life v. P.T. S. Properties, 838

7

P.2d 672, 674 (Utah App. 1992).3

While this standard applies to

the issue of whether the plaintiffs' motion was properly
considered as arising from Rule 60(b)(1) or Rule 60(b)(7), it is
not applicable to the other issues presented by this appeal.
Plaintiffs err in looking to the possible reasons behind the
trial courts decision in their effort to avoid the abuse of
discretion standard.

If plaintiffs were correct, the general

standard of review for denials of motions to set aside a judgment
would never be used.

The specific legal question of the

sufficiency of the facts of each case would be cited to show that
a correction of error standard should be used, and the trial
court would not be accorded its proper discretion in deciding
such motions.
The correct standard of review in this matter, contrary to
what is set out in the Brief of Appellants, is the deferential
abuse of discretion standard with only the one exception noted
above.
II. FAILURE OF THE DEFENDANTS TO FILE A
NOTICE OF SIGNING OR ENTRY OF JUDGMENT
NEITHER INVALIDATED THE ORDER OF DISMISSAL
NOR PREJUDICED THE PLAINTIFFS
The only defect that plaintiffs claim existed in the order
of dismissal entered by the trial court in this action is that
defendants did not file a notice of signing or entry of judgment
with the court and the plaintiffs concerning a stipulated
3

But it should be noted that the Supreme Court of Utah
used the abuse of discretion standard in a similar setting in
Gardiner and Gardiner Builders v. Swapp, 656 P. 2d 429, 430 (Utah
1982) .
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concedes that neither she nor the Division
complied with Rule 58A(d) or Rule 4.5 [4]
However, that noncompliance does not
invalidate the judgment. Utah R.Civ.P.
58A(c) provides that "[a] judgment is
complete and shall be deemed entered for al 1
purposes, except the creation of a lien on
real property, when the same is signed and
filed as hereinabove provided." Thus, in
Mountain States Tel. & Tel, v. Sohm, 755 P.2d
155, 157 (Utah 1988), the failure to give
notice of the judgment did not preclude the
effectiveness of the judgment, but rather,
under the circumstances, was harmless error.
Notice to the parties of the entry of the
judgment was therefore not a prerequisite to
its effectiveness.
Id, at 751 (footnote omitted).

See also Lincoln Beneficial Life

v, ID ,T. M. Properties,, fnR IP" ?f\ r,7?( P r. (Ill ah Ap(i

)
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invalidated the challenged judgment.

This court has made it

clear that, while such a failure to provide notice is an
important factor in determining the timeliness of a post-judgment
motion for which an exact time limit is not prescribed, it is not
a reason in itself for setting aside the judgment.

The appellant

in Workman did not prevail on her claim that she had not received
notice of the judgment against her, but rather on her claim that
the judgment was void because of independent procedural defects
in the handling of that class action.
This same result has been reached in the federal courts.
This conclusion is consistent with the case
law under the comparable federal rule. Rule
77(d) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
requires that the clerk of the court notify
the parties of the entry of a judgment.
Although in federal procedure it is thus the
clerk, rather than the prevailing party, who
bears the responsibility to give notice of
the judgment, the purpose and intended effect
of the Utah and the federal rules are the
same, namely, notice that a judgment has been
entered. Federal courts generally hold that
the losing party's lack of the required
notice does not preclude effectiveness of the
j udgment.
Workman. 802 P.2d at 751.

In Tucker v. Commonwealth Land Title

Ins. Co., 800 F.2d 1054, 1056 (11th Cir. 1986), the plaintiff
never received a copy of the judgment, and did not learn of the
judgment until after the time to file a notice of appeal had run.
The trial court, pursuant to a Rule 60(b) motion, vacated its
order and reentered it so as to permit the plaintiff to file an
appeal.

The appellate court dismissed the appeal, finding that

the trial court had abused its discretion in granting such
10
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With the apparent intent to refile the action, thereby
avoiding the question of the long overdue discovery responses and
the failure to file the requisite undertaking.

Plaintiffs wrongly suggest that they have been unfairly
prejudiced.

It was plaintiffs who initially proposed a dismissal

and had their attorney draft a stipulation and order to that
effect.

Their attorney signed the stipulation, approved it as to

form, and sent it to defense counsel for his signature.

Since

the proposed stipulation was substantively identical to one that
defendants had proposed earlier, it should have come as no
surprise that the defendants agreed to it, signed it, and filed
it with the court as requested by plaintiffs' attorney.
Defendants' counsel then instructed his secretary to send an
executed copy to plaintiffs' counsel, but he never received it.
Nevertheless, instead of asking about the stipulation or
attempting to prosecute the case, plaintiffs did nothing for the
next fourteen months.

It is unreasonable for plaintiffs to claim

unfair prejudice on these facts.

They certainly did not wait

fourteen months expecting defendants' counsel to respond to the
proposed stipulation.

Rather, they simply failed to follow

through on a matter they set in motion.
announced by the Tenth Circuit

The Rule 60(b) policy

Court of Appeals in Binder

Robinson & Co. v. U.S.S.C.C, 748 F.2d 1415, 1421 (10th Cir.
1984) is equally applicable here:
Keeping the suit alive merely because the plaintiff
should not be penalized for the omissions of his own
attorney would be visiting the sins of the plaintiff's
lawyer upon the defendant.
Id. at 1421 (emphasis in original) (quoting Link v. Wabash
Railroad, 370 U.S. 626, 634 n.10 (1962)).
prejudice.

Plaintiffs cannot show

Their proffered reason does not justify relief from
12
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claimed by the plaintiffs appear to be that this negligence or
inadvertence on the part of their attorneys precluded the
plaintiffs from refiling their action within one year of its
dismissal without prejudice.

In Lincoln Beneficial Life this

court held that a failure to act seasonably, through mistake or
neglect, falls within Rule 60(b)(1).

This court went on to hold

that if subsection one applied, subsection seven (which does not
have the same three month period of limitations) cannot be used.
As the residuary clause of Rule 60(b),
subsection (7) embodies three requirements
for relief: "First, that the reason be one
other than those listed in subdivisions (1)
through (6); second, that the reason justify
relief; and third, that the motion be made
within a reasonable time." Subsection (7)
"'should be very cautiously and sparingly
invoked by the Court only in unusual and
exceptional instances.'" Furthermore,
subsection (7) may not be employed for relief
when the grounds asserted are encompassed
within subsection (1). Otherwise the threemonth time limitation for filing motions
pursuant to subsection (1) would be
circumvented.
Lincoln Beneficial Life, 838 P.2d at 674-75 (emphasis in
original) (citations omitted).

See also Calder Bros. Co. v.

Anderson. 652 P.2d 922, 926 (Utah 1982) (rule 60(b)(7) is not
available to one who should have filed under rule 60(b)(1) but
did not).

This court's decision in Lincoln is of great

significance because that action also contained a claim that a
notice of entry of judgment had not been given.

Because the

instant action, like Lincoln, involves a failure to act
seasonably, defendants submit that the present action also falls
under subsection (1), and therefore the motion to set aside
14
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plaintiffs he

investigated and discovered that the order of dismissal had been

The equivalent provision of the federal rules is Rule
60(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. This is
because there is no federal counterpart to Rule 60(b) (4) ' l 'e
Utah Rules of Ci vil Procedure,

entered on September 16, 1991. This is neglect, if anything, and
falls within Rule 60(b)(1).
Plaintiffs rely on the Supreme Court of Utah's decision in
Bigelow v. Ingersoll, 618 P.2d 50 (Utah 1980) for a unique claim
that their time in which to file their motion to set aside the
judgment in this matter was somehow stayed.
on Bigelow is misplaced.

Plaintiffs' reliance

Rule 58A of the Utah Rules of Civil

Procedure was expressly amended so as to effectively overrule the
holding in Bigelow.

Workman, 802 P.2d at 751 n.4.

In both

Workman and Lincoln this court has expressly ruled that no such
stay exists under the current rule.

Indeed, Bigelow involved a

notice of appeal and not a post-trial motion.

Workman clearly

held that the Bigelow line of cases, since overruled by the
amendment of the Rules of Civil Procedure, never applied to posttrial motions.
Even if this court were to hold that the instant motion was
properly brought under Rule 60(b)(7), the plaintiffs motion was
still untimely.

The motion was not brought in a reasonable

amount of time.

It was unreasonable for the plaintiffs to take

sixteen months to file a motion to set aside a judgment that the
plaintiffs had requested and drafted.

There can be no claim of

prejudice when plaintiffs did nothing for over fourteen months to
attempt to prosecute the case or inquire as to the status of the
order their attorney drafted.

Plaintiffs' sixteen month delay in

bringing the motion for relief is therefore not reasonable.
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JAN GRAHAM - 1231
Attorney General
REED M. STRINGHAM - 4679
Assistant Attorney General
Attorney for State of Utah
330 South 300 East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 575-1650

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

JANICE ROUNDS and DYLAN
ROUNDS,
Plaintiffs,
v.
STATE OF UTAH, and UTAH
DEPARTMENT OF
TRANSPORTATION,
Defendants.

:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:

ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR
RELIEF FROM JUDGMENT

Civil No. 900902566PI
Judge J. Dennis Frederick

:

Plaintiffs filed a Motion for Relief from Judgment or
Order.

The parties filed supporting and opposing memoranda and

affidavits and the motion was submitted for decision on February
19, 1993. The Court denied the motion for the reasons stated in
its February 22, 1993 Minute Entry.

000183

IT IS ORDERED that plaintiffs' Motion for Relief from
Judgment is denied.
DATED this

_ ^ day of February, 1993.
9j^BY THE COURT:

<L.

DENNIS FREDERICK
rt Judge

MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy
of the foregoing ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR RELIEF FROM JUDGMENT,
this ^Jy

day of February, 1993, to the following:
Robert F. Orton
Milo S. Marsden
MARSDEN, ORTON, CAHOON & GOTTFREDSON
68 SOUTH MAIN STREET
FIFTH FLOOR
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84101
//&&€»>

/
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ADDENDUM "B"

RULE 60.

Relief from judgment or order.

(a) Clerical mistakes. Clerical mistakes in judgments, orders
or other parts of the record and errors therein arising from
oversight or omission may be corrected by the court at any
time of its own initiative or on the motion of any party and
after such notice, if any, as the court orders. During the
pendency of an appeal, such mistakes may be so corrected
before the appeal is docketed in the appellate court, and
thereafter while the appeal is pending may be so corrected
with leave of the appellate court.
(b)
Mistakes;
inadvertence;
excusable
neglect;
newly
discovered evidence; fraud # etc.
On motion and upon such
terms as are just, the court may in the furtherance of justice
relieve a party or his legal representative from a final
judgment, order, or proceeding for the following reasons: (1)
mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; (2)
newly discovered evidence which by due diligence could not
have been discovered in time to move for a new trial under
Rule
59(b);
(3)
fraud
(whether
heretofore
denominated
intrinsic or extrinsic) , misrepresentation or other misconduct
of an adverse party; (4) when, for any cause, the summons in
an action has not been personally served upon the defendant as
required by Rule 4(e) and the defendant has failed to appear
in said action; (5) the judgment is void; (6) the judgment has
been satisfied, released, or discharged, or a prior judgment
upon which it is based has been reversed or otherwise vacated,
or it is no longer equitable that the judgment should have
prospective application; or (7) any other reason justifying
relief from the operation of the judgment. The motion shall
be made within a reasonable time and for reasons (1), (2) ,
(3) , or (4) , not more than 3 motions after the judgment,
order, or proceeding was entered or taken.
A motion under
this Subdivision (b) does not affect the finality of a
judgment or suspend its operation. This rule does not limit
the power of a court to entertain an independent action to
relieve a party from a judgment, order or proceeding or to set
aside a judgment for fraud upon the court. The procedure for
obtaining any relief from a judgment shall be by motion as
prescribed in these rules or by an independent action.

ADDENDUM "C"

RULE 4-504.

Written orders # judgments and decrees

Intent:
To establish a uniform procedure for submitting written
orders, judgments, and decrees to the court.
This rule is not
intended to change existing law with respect to the enforceability
of unwritten agreements.
Applicability:
This rule shall apply to all civil proceedings in
courts of record except small claims.
Statement of the Rule:
(1) In all rulings by a court, counsel for the party or
parties obtaining the ruling shall within fifteen days, or within
a shorter time as the court may direct, file with the court a
proposed order, judgment, or decree in conformity with the ruling.
(2) Copies of the proposed findings, judgments, and orders
shall be served upon opposing counsel before being presented to the
court for signature unless the court otherwise orders. Notice of
objections shall be submitted to the court and counsel within five
days after service.
(3) Stipulated settlements and dismissals shall also be
reduced to writing and presented to the court for signature within
fifteen days of the settlement and dismissal.
(4) Upon entry of judgment, notice of such judgment shall be
served upon the opposing party and proof of such service shall be
filed with the court.
All judgments, orders, and decrees, or
copies thereof, which are to be transmitted after signature by the
judge, including other correspondence requiring a reply, must be
accompanied by pre-addressed envelopes and pre-paid postage.
(5) All orders, judgments, and decrees shall be prepared in
such a manner as to show whether they are entered upon the
stipulation of counsel, the motion of counsel or upon the court's
own initiative and shall identify the attorneys of record in the
cause or proceeding in which the judgment, order or decree is made.
(6) Except where otherwise ordered, all judgments and decrees
shall contain the address or the last known address of the judgment
debtor and the social security number of the judgment debtor if
known.
(7) All judgments and decrees shall be prepared as separate
documents and shall not include any matters by reference unless
otherwise directed by the court. Orders not constituting judgments
or decrees may be made a part of the documents containing the
stipulation or motion upon which the order is based.
(8) No orders, judgments, or decrees based upon stipulation
shall be signed or entered unless the stipulation is in writing,
signed by the attorneys of record for the respective parties and
filed with the clerk or the stipulation was made on the record.
(9) In all cases where judgment is rendered upon a written
obligation to pay money and a judgment has previously been rendered
upon the same written obligation, the plaintiff or plaintiff's
counsel shall attach to the new complaint a copy of all previous
judgments based upon the same written obligation.
(10) Nothing in this rule shall be construed to limit the
power of any court, upon a proper showing, to enforce a settlement
agreement or any other agreement which has not been reduced to
writing.

